“We Have Our Own Revolvers”: How Security Forces and Criminal Gangs May Divide Russia’s Fuel Market
As Russia faces mounting pressure on its fuel supply chains, analysts and observers are increasingly warning of a potential transformation in how gasoline and diesel reach ordinary consumers. What begins as speculation and queue-jumping at gas stations could evolve into something far more sinister: a complete criminal takeover of fuel logistics and distribution networks. The phrase “we have our own revolvers” — echoing the lawless rhetoric of the 1990s — captures the essence of what some fear lies ahead for Russia’s energy sector.
The foundations for a black market in fuel have been laid by a perfect storm of circumstances. International sanctions have disrupted refinery operations, drone attacks have damaged critical infrastructure, and export restrictions have created artificial shortages in domestic markets. When official channels fail to deliver essential commodities, shadow economies inevitably emerge to fill the void. Historical precedent suggests that Russia is particularly vulnerable to this dynamic, given its experience with organized crime infiltrating legitimate business sectors during previous periods of economic turmoil.
The evolution of fuel black markets typically follows a predictable pattern observed in other countries facing similar crises. Initially, small-scale speculators exploit shortages by purchasing fuel at official prices and reselling it at significant markups. This might involve individuals with connections to gas station employees or fleet managers who can secure priority access. However, as shortages persist and profits grow, more organized criminal elements inevitably take notice. The transition from opportunistic speculation to systematic criminal enterprise can occur with alarming speed.
Russia’s 1990s provide a sobering template for what could unfold. During that chaotic decade following the Soviet collapse, organized crime groups — often operating with tacit approval or direct involvement of corrupt officials — seized control of entire economic sectors. The aluminum wars, banking sector violence, and petroleum industry conflicts of that era demonstrated how quickly criminal organizations could establish dominance over valuable commodity chains. Security services, rather than combating this criminalization, frequently became participants in the spoils system, blurring the lines between law enforcement and lawbreaking.
The logistics of fuel distribution make it particularly susceptible to criminal capture. Unlike digital goods or easily concealed contraband, gasoline and diesel require physical infrastructure: storage facilities, tanker trucks, and distribution points. Controlling these chokepoints allows criminal organizations to extract tribute at every stage of the supply chain. In regions where state authority has weakened or become corrupted, local strongmen — whether wearing police uniforms or not — can effectively become the arbiters of who receives fuel and at what price. This creates a parallel economy operating alongside, and eventually replacing, legitimate commerce.
The involvement of security services in such schemes represents perhaps the most troubling dimension of this potential crisis. The Chekist tradition — referring to members of security organs dating back to the Soviet-era Cheka — has long been associated with both protecting state interests and pursuing private enrichment. When state-owned enterprises control fuel production and distribution, the line between official allocation and corrupt diversion becomes dangerously thin. Regional FSB officers, police commanders, and military logistics personnel all possess the authority and access to redirect fuel supplies toward black market channels while providing protection from prosecution.
For ordinary Russian citizens, particularly those in rural areas and smaller cities, this evolution could prove catastrophic. Agriculture depends heavily on diesel for tractors and transport. Heating oil remains essential in regions without natural gas connections. Small businesses require fuel for delivery vehicles and generators. When criminal networks control access to these necessities, communities become hostages to extortion. The social fabric frays as neighbors compete for scarce resources and corruption becomes normalized as the only path to survival. The consequences extend far beyond economics into the realm of civic trust and social cohesion.
Whether Russia can avoid this trajectory remains uncertain. Much depends on the government’s ability to maintain refinery operations, secure supply chains, and prevent the security services from becoming participants in rather than opponents of black market activity. Historical experience, however, suggests skepticism is warranted. The phrase about revolvers speaks to a mentality where might makes right and official authority exists primarily to be circumvented or captured. As fuel shortages persist and deepen, the struggle between those who control supply and those who need it may increasingly resemble the anarchic capitalism of three decades ago — with all its violence, corruption, and human cost.
